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AMNESTY FOR DRAFT EVADERS?
THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION OF SENATOR ROBERT TAFT, JR.
AND CONGRESSMAN EDWARD KOCH
I. INTRODUCTION
Just as the pentagon has formulated contingency plans for the
return of the POW's, Congress must give thought to preparing
the structure by which amnesty will be granted. I can only hope
that such a plan will not seek punishment or retribution, but
has as its guide compassion. Valerie M. Kushner, wife of a pri-
soner of war.'
A dilemma confronting the United States as the war in Vietnam
de-escalates is what is to be done with those young American
men who, for reasons of conscience, bad advice, or whatever, chose
illegal alternatives to military service in that war.2 To resolve
this dilemma, legislation has been introduced into both houses of
Congress which would grant amnesty to those men who evaded
the Selective Service law during the course of the Vietnam war.3
The motivation upon which the legislation is founded entails a
compassionate desire to reunite these young men with their fami-
lies, communities, and country. The legislators who support the
1. Amnesty: Repatriation for Draft Evaders, Deserters, 30 CONG. Q.
WKLy. REP. 506, 508 (March 4, 1972) (remarks of Mrs. Kushner).
2. Draft evasion, as an illegal alternative to military service, primarily
entails either failure to register with the Selective Service System or fail-
ure to accept induction into the armed forces when called. The offense
subjects the evader to a maximum sentence of five years in federal prison
and/or a fine of $10,000. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (a) (1970). The maximum
sentence has been held not to be cruel and unusual punishment and many
courts have not hesitated to invoke it. Quaid v. United States, 386 F.2d
25, 27 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Weissman, 434 F.2d 175, 180 (8th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 982 (1971); United States v. Shunk, 438
F.2d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1971). Draft evasion cases are determined within
the jurisdiction of the civil, as opposed to military, courts. Billings v.
Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 558 (1944); United States v. Farinas, 448 F.2d 1334,
1339 (2d Cir. 1971).
3. Amnesty proposes a full pardon to a class of offenders without
regard to personal identities or particular circumstances. D. Jones & D.
Raish, American Deserters and Draft Evaders: Punishment or Am-
nesty? 13 ITuv. Ixi'L L.J. 88, 113 (1972). The distinction between am-
nesty and pardon is of no practical significance. Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
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amnesty proposals challenge the nation to be "strong enough to be
compassionate and understanding .... -4 They argue that the
means for displaying this compassion is amnesty. The amnesty
need not, however, be proposed out of "remorse or of sympathy.
It would simply be offering a practical solution to what is or
should be a national concern ... ,5 the healing of our national
wounds. It is a means of restoring "harmony to our society and
unity to our nation"6 by returning potentially valuable citizens to
work toward its progress and development 7 while offering to the
nation's youth a demonstration of humanity by the government.8
The questions which must be answered affirmatively following
this most divisive war are whether the nation will offer the draft
evader the "opportunity to be reunified with our American so-
ciety"" and whether the nation "wants to offer reconciliation to
a generation of young Americans."'10
II. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
On March 6, 1972, Senator Taft demonstrated the extent of
the draft resistance movement in this country by presenting fig-
4. 118 CONG. REC. 33,3341 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) (remarks of Sena-
tor Taft).
5. Id.
6. See note 1 supra at 507 (remarks of Mr. Henry Steele Commanger).
7. 117 CONG. REC. 18,21589 (daily ed. December 14, 1971) (remarks of
Senator Taft).
8. The reasons for amnesty are further reinforced by the fact that such
would be responsive to the public will. A recent public opinion survey
showed 71% of those polled favored the return of the draft evaders through
some form of amnesty. A Poll; How the U.S. Feels About Amnesty,
NEwswEEK, January 17, 1972, at 20. Senator Taft has pointed to wide-
spread editorial support by the nation's press for some form of amnesty.
118 CONG. REc. 2,50-59 (daily ed. January 19, 1972) (remarks of Senator
Taft). Amnesty also appears compatible with the views of national lead-
ers. In a recent CBS television interview President Nixon stated, "I, for
one, would be very liberal with regard to amnesty, but not when there are
Americans in Vietnam... and not while POW's are held in North Viet-
nam." Having voiced this support, the President did go on in apparent
contradiction to state that "[I]t would have to be on the basis of their
paying the price, of course, that anyone should pay for violating the law."
118 CoNG. REc. 33,3344 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) (text of the CBS inter-
view). The democratic presidential nominee, Senator George McGovern,
has supported amnesty unequivocally. 117 CONG. Rac. 164,17375 (daily ed.
November 2, 1971).
9. See note 7 supra at 21588.
10. See note 1 supra at 507 (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
ures to Congress showing five hundred draft "resisters" in federal
prisons, an additional 3900 under federal indictment, and perhaps
70,000 young Americans living abroad to avoid the draft. 1 Others
have placed the number of "resisters" living abroad as high as
100,000 but have failed to distinguish between draft evaders and
deserters from the armed forces. 12 More conservative estimates
discount those figures as being far too excessive, even if deserters
are included.'3
There is simply no accurate guide to the number of draft evad-
ers. This is partially due to two factors: the nature of the problem
of determining exactly how many men have failed to perform
a positive duty of registration with the Selective Service and a lack
of precision in the use of the term "draft evader" which is here
defined as one who has refused to register with the Selective Serv-
ice System or has refused induction into the armed forces."4 But
the figures used by many when discussing "draft resisters" also
include deserters from the armed forces as well as men who have
duly registered with the Selective Service System, but then fear-
ing the draft, have fled the country or gone into hiding while in
fact they have never been called for induction and have not com-
mitted the offense of refusing induction.
While it is apparent that the class of draft evaders numbers in
the thousands, many more of our citizens are affected than any
estimate of the number of evaders alone can reveal. Any realis-
tic measurement of the division and alienation created by the prob-
lem must include the number of wives, relatives, and friends who
have been separated from the men or who have followed them into
exile.15 Indeed, the dilemma is a "major phenomenon-and a deeply
tragic one."' 6
In a real sense the actual numbers become immaterial when it
is fully realized that a great many Americans chose prison or exile
rather than involvement in a long and divisive war. Many more
who wish to see their return and an end to the alienation have
been left behind. The evader has thus become a symbol to many
of the divisions in this country; his return is seen as a chance
for reconciliation. In direct contradiction to this need and desire
11. See note 4 supra.
12. See note 1 supra; Pardon for Draft Dodgers, Deserters, U.S. Nzws
AND WORLD REP., March 13, 1972, at 68.
13. They Can't Go Home Again, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1970, at 88.
14. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Id.
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for reunification is the fact that the present impact of the law con-
stitutes an effective bar to the return of the evader.17
III. CONGRESSIONAL AcTION ON AMNESTY?
If amnesty is to be granted to the draft evaders of the Viet-
nam war, the question remains from what authority should the
amnesty come? There can be no doubt that the President has
the power to grant amnesty.'8 The precedents for presidential ac-
tion are numerous.' 9 Presidential action is indeed possible as
President Nixon has indicated that he favors some form of am-
nesty;20 however, accepting the rationale for amnesty as being a
desire to reunify the country, congressional action is more desir-
able. The debate concerning the war in Vietnam has often in-
volved charges of over use and misuse of presidential power coup-
led with a failure to consult with Congress. This opinion among
many has added to the divisions in the country and has resulted in
much bitter criticism directed at the personality in the White
House.
17. The evader who fled the country will face criminal charges no mat-
ter when he returns if the effect of the law remains unchanged. 18
U.S.C. § 3290 (1970) (there is no Statute of Limitations for persons fleeing
from justice); Fogel v. United States, 162 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1947), cert.
granted, reversed on other grounds, 335 U.S. 865 (1948); McGregor v.
United States, 206 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1953) (both holding that continuing
failure to register with the draft is a continuing offense); but see United
States v. Toussie, 280 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (here holding that a
five year limitation does apply). It is highly unlikely that the expatriate
evader would voluntarily return to confront such continuing charges. Ad-
ditionally, extradition from either Canada or Sweden does not appear
feasible. D. Jones & D. Raish, American Deserters and Draft Evaders:
Exile, Punishment or Amnesty?, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 88, 106 (1972) (Neither
the Swedish nor Canadian extradition treaties with the United States re-
quires extradition . . . thus . . . the status of the deserter or the draft
evader who wish to take refuge ... turns on the discretion of the asylum
state); and in any extradition proceeding the evader could plead that the
offense for which he is wanted is political in nature and therefore non-
extraditable. Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradition, 32
ALBANY L. Rv. 337, 357 (1968).
18. U.S. CoNsT. art. H, § 2, states "[H] e shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment."
19. Many recent legal and non-legal publications have discussed the
many precedents for presidential amnesty. For easy reference, a list of
the precedents compiled by John C. Etridge of the Congressional Re-
search Service, the Library of Congress, as been included in the Appendix.
20. See note 8 supra (text of CBS interview).
The reunification of the nation would be better served by con-
gressional action which would be a more broadly based demon-
stration of a bi-partisan effort to heal the society's wounds. The
power of Congress to so act is, however, less apparent than the
presidential authority because there are fewer precedents; but
precedents supporting amnesty legislation by Congress do exist,
and the courts have affirmed the existence of such power.
In Brown v. Walker the Supreme Court held that "although the
Constitution vests in the President power to grant reprieves and
pardons . . . (that) power has never been held to take from Con-
gress the power to pass acts of general amnesty."21 It is admitted
that the Constitutional power of the President cannot be "limited"
by legislative action, but neither is that power exclusive on the
subject of amnesty. It is a power which is concurrent with Con-
gress.2
2
The Congress has exercised this power on occasion and has there-
by established sufficient precedents. In 1865 Congress passed a
conditional amnesty wherein it permitted deserters from the mili-
tary during the Civil War to return to service within sixty days
without punishment, or thereafter face the usual penalties for
desertion.23 In 1872 the legislature again acted with amnesty for
many former rebels of the Civil War by lifting the political re-
strictions imposed on them by the Fourteenth Article of Amend-
ments of the Constitution. 24 That anmesty, by excluding certain
persons, 25 narrowed the class affected, but it nevertheless granted
a general amnesty to many former rebels.
In 1884 Congress granted further amnesty to more former con-
federates by allowing their service on juries and in civil offices.26
It again acted in 1896 to repeal the sanctions against former rebels
which had denied them appointments to military commissions.27
The last of the Civil War related congressional amnesties was
enacted in 1898 by the Universal Amnesty Act of June 6, which
removed all sanctions against all former rebels, returning them
21. 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).
22. The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 414 (1885); United States v. Morris, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 246,285 (1825).
23. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490.
24. Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142.
25. "[E~xcept Senators and Representatives of the thirty-sixth and thir-
ty-seventh Congress, officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of
the United States, heads of departments and foreign ministers of the
United States." Id.
26. Act of May 13, 1884, ch. 46, 23 Stat. 21, 22.
27. Act of March 31, 1896, ch. 84, 29 Stat. 84.
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to complete status as citizens. 28
It is significant to emphasize that Congress took an eminent role
in the granting of amnesties in the post Civil War era when na-
tional divisions were most severe.29 Those amnesties were in-
tended to heal the social wounds and reunify the country. Al-
though the congressional precedents are not so numerous as those
involving the presidential power to grant amnesty, clearly Con-
gress does have the power to act when the circumstances war-
rant.30 The need at this time for an amnesty to be granted in a
unifying, bi-partisan manner, requires congressional action.
IV. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The Conditional Amnesty of Senator Taft
On December 14, 1971, Senator Robert Taft, Jr. (R. Ohio) intro-
duced S. 3011, entitled The Amnesty Act of 1972, as a bill to offer
conditional amnesty to those "[W] ho have failed or refused to reg-
ister for the draft or who have failed or refused induction .... "31
The senator prefaced the introduction of the legislation with re-
marks reminding his colleagues that:
America is a strong country. America is a good country. And I
believe that America is the type of country which will give
these young men an opportunity to be reunited to the land of their
birth by making valuable and positive contributions to our national
life.32
The Amnesty Act of 1972 would apply to those who have evaded
the draft after August 4, 1964,83 and would specifically exclude de-
serters whom Senator Taft believes must be dealt with in other
28. Act of June 6, 1898, ch. 389, 30 Stat. 432 (emphasis added).
29. An additional act of congressional pardon unrelated to the Civil war
was enacted in 1893 when Congress granted amnesty to the class of per-
sons required to testify before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
legislation stated that "no person shall be prosecuted . . . on account of
any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify... be-
fore said commission." Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
30. Some deny that the search for supporting precedents is relevant.
This view sees the Vietnam war as "[U]nlike any in the nation's history"
and therefore "perhaps no precedent should be sought" The Pros and
Cons of Granting Amnesty, TnhE, January 10, 1972, at 16.
31. S. 3011, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
32. See note 7 supra.
33. See note 31 supra.
ways because they have broken a formal oath to the United States
and because to pardon them would greatly disrupt the armed
forces.34
S. 3011 proposes amnesty for those who meet certain conditions."
The conditions would require that the evader present himself
within one year of enactment to the administrative control of the
Attorney General, or other presidentially designated official, for
three years of alternate service to the United States either in the
military or in a civilian pursuit such as Volunteers in Service to
America (VISTA), a Public Health Service or Veterans' Admin-
istration hospital, or "other Federal service. '3 6 The choice be-
tween military or civilian service would be made by the evader
who presumably would be allowed some discretion as to his spe-
cific field of endeavor and location of service subject to adminis-
trative direction based on national needs and the applicant's par-
ticular skills. He would serve at the lowest pay scale.3 7
S. 3011 would also release from prison any person serving a sen-
tence for evasion subject to his meeting the conditions of amnesty,
with the provision that his time of alternate service would be
reduced by the amount of time already served in prison, with a
maximum reduction of two years.38
This proposal would not, however, grant amnesty in the same
manner in which Congress acted in the post Civil War era. The
actual act of pardon would remain a function of the President,
with S. 3011 serving technically only to express the "sense of the
Congress." 39 It would be the sense of the Congress that the Pres-
ident grant amnesty to those members of the class evaders who
within one year of enactment agree to serve their nation in some
form of alternate service and then complete that service.40  The
proposal is thus an exercise of congressional authority coupled
with a recognition of presidential power and seeks to involve both
branches of government in any grant of amnesty.
Although no specific provision is included in the bill which
would require that the amnesty be granted only after the cessa-
tion of the war in Vietnam, it is inherent in the proposal that
the amnesty would not be granted until the completion of the al-
34. See note 4 supra at 3342.
35. See note 31 supra at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
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ternate service and the meeting of all conditions. Thus, for the
vast majority of evaders, the amnesty would not be granted for
a minimum of three years after enactment, and for those rela-
tively few who have served in prison for two or more years, am-
nesty would follow no earlier than one year after enactment. 41
Given these time elements, and the announced policy of the Nixon
administration to disengage from the war, it would appear unlikely
that amnesty would be granted before the end of significant Amer-
ican involvement in Vietnam.42
The Conditional Amnesty of Congressman Koch
On January 18, 1972, Congressman Edward Koch (D.-N.Y.) dis-
played bi-partisan support for conditional amnesty for draft evad-
ers by introducing H.R. 12417. 43 The Congressman summarized
his position by stating that:
It is time that our country put aside its differences and lay to
rest the acrimony that has consumed us. Instituting this condi-
tional amnesty that demands some compromise from everyone
would be a step in this direction.44
H.R. 12417 is essentially identical to S. 3011 in that it calls for
alternate service for draft evaders as a condition for receiving
amnesty from the President.4 5 A significant difference is that
Congressman Koch proposes only two years of alternate service
believing this to be appropriate because two years is the length of
service presently required of conscientious objectors.46
An evader who has served time in prison could have his alter-
nate service time reduced by up to one year,4 7 leaving him a
minimum of one year of service as is required under S. 3011.48
41. Practical considerations involving the establishment of the amnesty
program would undoubtedly delay the beginning of the alternate service
for some time after enactment. This would further delay the actual date
of amnesty.
42. At present no hearings have been held on S. 3011. Letter from Sen-
ator Taft to author, June 20, 1972.
43. 118 CONG. REc. H 68 (daily ed. January 18, 1972) (remarks of Con-
gressman Koch).
44. Id.
45. H.R. 12417, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
46. See note 43 supra.
47. See note 45 supra.
48. On January 26, 1972, Congressman Koch introduced additional leg-
islation. This bill would state the approval of the Congress for any am-
V. OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED AiMNESTY
Although at present there have been no hearings directed spe-
cifically to the proposed legislation, the Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Practices and Procedures of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, Senator Edward Kennedy, chairman, has recently held wide
ranging hearings on the Selective Service System in which testi-
mony concerning amnesty was introduced.49 That testimony re-
flected the potential objections to the Taft and Koch bills.
Arguments from Those Opposed to Amnesty
Timeliness: A universal objection from those testifying in oppo-
sition to amnesty was that any such proposal cannot be enter-
tained until the end of hostilities and the return of our prisoners
of war. This political reality was expressed by President Nixon
when he stated:
As long as there are Americans who chose to serve their country
rather than desert their country ... and they are there in Viet-
nam, there will be no amnesty for those who deserted their coun-
try.50
Such an objection is well founded. A granting of amnesty while
a substantial number of American combat soldiers risk their lives
in Vietnam and American prisoners of war remain in captivity
would undoubtedly offend the basic sense of equity of the Ameri-
can people. It does not follow, however, that as the American in-
volvement in the war diminishes, and as the consensus is reached
that this war is truly unlike previous wars in that a definitive res-
olution occurring on a specific date may never come, that legisla-
tion cannot be enacted which begins the process today of recon-
ciliation for tomorrow.
This is exactly what the proposed legislation would accomplish.
It is explicit in H.R. 12664 where Congressman Koch refers to the
"cessation of hostilities."5 1 It is implicit in S. 3011 and H.R. 12417
when the authorization for the President to grant amnesty is made
contingent upon the completion of the alternate service which
nesty the President would wish to grant to any person who had suf-
fered "legal disadvantages" as a result of illegal opposition to the Viet-
nam war. Congressman Koch is -in effect stating that if the President
should grant an amnesty, then Congress should sanction such amnesty.
An important aspect of the bill is that it specifically supports amnesty
only upon the "cessation of hostilities," a determination to be made by
the President. H.R. 12664, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
49. See note 1 supra (hereafter referred to as the subcommittee).
50. See note 8 supra (text of CBS Nixon interview).
51. See note 48 supra.
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could not be done by the vast majority of the draft evaders in less
than two years under the Koch proposal and three years un-
der the Taft bill.52
Therefore, although the objections concerning the timeliness of
amnesty are valid, the present proposals answer these objections
by presenting a compromise which would begin the reconciliation
process upon enactment but withhold amnesty for a sufficient time
to allow the total disengagement from the war. At the same time
another reason to hasten the end of the war is provided.
Military Objections:
1. Deserters: On March 1, 1972, Maj. Gen. Leo E. Benade pre-
sented the position of the Department of Defense to the subcom-
mittee concerning amnesty. "[A]ny amnesty to deserters at this
time, whether general or particular ... would have a serious
detrimental impact on our armed forces."53  This objection, di-
rected at deserters only, does not affect the proposed legislation
which deals with draft evaders only, and the military's position did
not eliminate possible amnesty for deserters at the end of hostili-
ties.
2. Danger to further inductions: A more immediate objection
concerning the military came from Curtis W. Tarr who argued
that amnesty for the evader would make it "difficult to justify
the continuation of induction."'54 The argument is not impressive,
however, when recent moves toward an all volunteer army and
the decision by President Nixon to halt the use of draftees in Viet-
nam are considered. 5
Mr. Tarr was also concerned with the potential for the establish-
ment of a dangerous precedent which would encourage future
evaders of future drafts.56 A precedent thus established might
become an "unwelcome tradition" which would deny the United
States necessary forces in future times of conflict.5 7 But the
historical precedents which show that it is indeed the tradition of
52. See notes 41 and 54, supra.
53. See note 1 supra at 509 (remarks of Gen. Benade) (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 507 (remarks of Mr. Tarr).
55. The War: Giving and Getting, ThmE, July 10, 1972, at 18.
56. See note 1 supra at 507 (remarks of Mr. Tarr).
57. Id.
the United States to grant amnesty in post war periods refute
this position. These past precedents have not hindered our ability
to induct the necessary manpower for subsequent wars.
The more fundamental reason that these precedents have not
been a hindrance to later inductions is the fact that the ultimate
ability of the United States to fulfill its manpower requirements
in times of war has not rested on the ability to enforce manda-
tory selective service laws, but rather in the basic willingness of
the nation's young men to serve when the necessity has arisen.
The manpower needs of the country have not been satisfied in
the final analysis by a system of forced servitude, but by a volun-
tary acceptance of duty when the patriotic need has been evident.
An amnesty today with the goal of national reunification will not
be the reason future American armies are understaffed. If that
is to occur, it will be because the government has failed to con-
vince the citizens that the cause is just and necessary, or indeed,
because the cause is not just and necessary and the young men so
perceive it.
3. Damage to military and veteran morale: The military estab-
lishment58 also believes that an amnesty for those who avoided
military service would detrimentally affect the morale of those
who are doing and have done their service. 9 The serious morale
problem now confronting the army could worsen if bad feelings
were engendered in those presently serving by seeing others who
evaded service absolved of any duty. Under the proposed legisla-
tion, however, the soldier now serving would see the evader also
serving his country. Of course, the alternate service does not
carry with it the risk to life and limb which faces the soldier, but
the conditions placed upon any amnesty by the proposed legisla-
tion do require valuable and potentially difficult service. This
fact should lessen any possible resentment by those now serving
and subsequently diminish the morale damaging aspects of am-
nesty.
A more solemn objection which affects the military is the
highly emotional charge that "[A] ny amnesty ... would make a
58. It should be noted that many veterans of the Vietnam war do not
share the views of the Department of Defense in its opposition to amnesty.
Many Vietnam veterans are now at the forefront of the amnesty movement.
Universal Amnesty, Tn NEw REPUBLIC, February 5, 1972, at 15, 16.
59. One could perhaps doubt that the present state of morale in the
military, and in the army in particular, could sink below its present
nadir. The Outpost is a Shambles, LIE, March 31, 1972, at 28-33; Armed
Forces: Disorder in the Ranks, TIME, August 9, 1971, at 21.
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mockery of the sacrifices of those men who did their duty."60
It is the view that an amnesty for those who did not serve would
be unjust to those who did, and particularly those who died. This
position was most poignantly presented to the subcommittee by
a Mr. Kelley, the father of a soldier killed in Vietnam. Mr. Kelley
showed great bitterness toward the very fact that such an idea
was being considered in the Senate while the fighting and dying
continued and stated "[T]his committee would be better engaged
in building a memorial to the 50,000 Americans who gave their
lives in Vietnam."' 1
This position perhaps cannot be reconciled by the supporters of
amnesty. The relatives and friends of those who died in Vietnam
may never believe that had a certain evader served as was his duty,
their loved one might still be alive. This argument demonstrates
that in an effort to heal the nation's wounds and to bring recon-
ciliation to the country, others may be hurt and alienated.
It is this dilemma which the Taft and Koch proposals attempt
to resolve. Most certainly no action can end the anguish of a Mr.
Kelley. But the proposed conditional amnesty seeks the same goal
for which men believed they died in Vietnam in that its motiva-
tion is the betterment of the American society through the ending
of the deep divisions within this country. Already some of those
deeply hurt by the Vietnam tragedy see the compatibility of the
goals. Mr. Robert Ransom, another parent of a soldier killed in
Vietnam, disagrees with Mr. Kelley. He believes that amnesty
would bring "no dishonor" to his son for such a generous act would
be compatible with the type of nation for which his son was willing
to fight.62
Law Breakers should be punished: A final objection to amnesty
presented to the subcommittee is that the basic foundation of any
government is compliance with the laws of the nation and a grant-
ing of amnesty to those who so knowingly and wilfully broke the
law would be an affront to law abiding citizens. 63 "Obligations
60. See note 1 supra (remarks of Mr. Geiger, national commander of the
American Legion).
61. Id. (remarks of Mr. Martin Kelley).
62. Id. (remarks of Mr. Robert Ransom).
63. Amnesty, the Availability of Existing Procedures, VITAL SPEEcBEs or
THE DAY, April 15, 1972, at 402.
of citizenship cannot be applied to some and evaded by others."'6
This argument contradicts the very principle so long established
in our body of laws which permits the granting of pardons for of-
fenders when circumstances warrant. The best interests of this
country are served by reunifying the society and benefiting from
the alternate service of the lawbreakers. Those interests should not
be sacrificed to a never yielding principle of punishment. Of course,
a balance between generosity on one hand and upholding the
sovereignty of the law on the other must be sought. This is the
goal of the proposed legislation which attempts compromise by ex-
cusing certain violations of the law in exchange for service to the
country.
Objections from Those in Favor of Unconditional Amnesty
The subcommittee also heard opposition to conditional amnesty
from those who favor universal, unqualified amnesty for those who
acted in opposition to the war in Vietnam. This opposition is
based on the premise that attaching conditions to the amnesty is
no amnesty at all. Some see the alternate service as a "punitive
string"65 which would entail some moral judgment by the country
upon those who refused to serve when in fact it should be the
right of the evader or deserter, who refused to take part in an
"immoral" war, to pass judgment upon the country.60  By this
view the present proposals do not meet the "moral require-
ment. ' 67 As a result, many of the men it would be hoped would
be returned to this country by the conditional amnesty simply will
not come.68 This reasoning concludes that the proposed amnesty
would thereby fail at its principle objective.
This view again demonstrates the intensity of the divisions on
this issue and lends further importance to an attempt at recon-
ciliation. But the attempt at unification cannot be made at the
price of creating more divisions within the society; unconditional
amnesty holds the great potential for creating even more wounds
among those who have served but who would see others escape
without any service at all.
The call for unconditional amnesty simply does not accept the
political and social reality that there are many in this nation who
64. Id.
65. See note 1 supra at 508 (remarks of Mr. Timothy Maloney).
66. Amnesty for the War Exiles?, NEwswEEK, January 17, 1972, at 19.
67. See note 58 supra.
68. See note 1 supra at 507 (remarks of Mr. Arlo Tatum); and see
note 66 supra at 24, 25.
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are adamantly opposed to a return of the evaders without some
service to the country. The advocates of unconditional amnesty
would accept a return of the evader at the expense of deep and
understandable alienation of another segment of society.
What is needed is a commitment to the worthy goal of amnesty
by the supporters of both sides. Those opposed to amnesty must
realize that the alternate service is a non-punitive means of re-
introducing into the American society those who have been sepa-
rated. The evader himself must realize that the political reality
of the day will not accept, and the goals of amnesty will not be
served, by a rather pompous demand on his part to pass moral
judgment upon the country as a condition for his return.
A final objection by some supporters of amnesty concerns the
exclusion of the deserter from the class to be granted amnesty
under the proposed legislation. This argument does not agree
with Senator Taft that the distinction between the draft evader
and the deserter, the fact that the latter has taken an oath, is of
such significance as to require that the deserter be omitted from
the proposed airmesty. Rather, the true distinction is seen as one
of social class and father's income.6 9 The evader is seen as gen-
erally from a higher economic strata with a more advanced ed-
ucation than the deserter.70 The evader is one who was more at-
tuned to his opportunities to flee the draft before induction, while
the generally less educated deserter from the lower economic sec-
tor accepted induction without question or consultation with the
campus draft counseling service and only later sought refuge from
the war through desertion. This argument holds that the exclu-
sion of the deserter from those affected by amnesty would be a dis-
crimination in favor of the middle class, college educated draft
evader.
This position has validity in light of the stated goals of reunifi-
cation and compassion. While attempting to heal the nation's
wounds, should we not attempt to heal them all? Would not the
deserter also be capable of either returning to military service, as
was permitted by congressional action in 1865,'7 1 or to undertake al-
69. See note 1 supra at 508 (remarks of Mr. Mike Hendricks).
70. A. TATUm & J. TucmNsKY, GUIDE TO THE DRAFT (1969), at 229.
71. See note 23 supra.
ternate civilian service for the betterment of the nation? There
are sufficient precedents for granting amnesty to deserters as well
as draft evaders, and the objections of the military which would
be most vehement while the war is in progress need not discour-
age amnesty for the deserters at the end of the hostilities. In-
clusion of the deserters in an amnesty proposal would best serve
the stated goals of such legislation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent that the interests of national harmony and social
reunification could well be served by the granting of amnesty to
those young Americans who chose illegal alternatives to service
in the war in Vietnam. Legislation which would establish the
framework in which amnesty could be granted has been introduced
into Congress. It would provide the means for Congress to accept
responsibility for amnesty in a bi-partisan display of support.
The amnesty should pardon the class of individuals defined as
draft evaders and military deserters. While the class deserters
may be distinguished from the draft evaders in that the former
have broken an oath to their country, the practical distinction may
well be based more upon economic and educational differences
which should not prevent one group from being given the oppor-
tunity to be reunited with their country. The determining factor
for those who must decide whether to include deserters in any
amnesty should be the realization that the goals of the amnesty
would be best served by the inclusion of the deserters.
While it is evident that an amnesty can serve the interests of the
country, it is imperative that the form of amnesty heal the wounds
in the national fabric without creating new ones. There are suffi-
cient precedents to support either conditional or unconditional
amnesty with the final decision concerning the type to be granted
dependent upon the particular circumstances. Today, amnesty
conditioned upon service to the nation is the most practical means
of returning the offenders to the American society72 while up-
holding the integrity of the law and avoiding the alienation of
other important groups. The requirement of two years of alter-
72. This is not to deny that the establishment of programs for alternate
service may encounter practical difficulties. These may range from
bookkeeping problems to the type of motivational problem often en-
countered in low paying jobs. But this country has solved similar problems
in past programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps (C.C.C.) and the
Works Progress Administration (W.P.A.). The potential value of alternate
service should offset any initial drawbacks.
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nate service as would be a prerequisite under the Koch proposal
is founded upon a reasonable comparison, the length of service
required of conscientious objectors, and avoids the stigma of serv-
ice as punishment.
It is also evident that in order to avoid injustice to those pres-
ently serving in Vietnam or being held as prisoners of war, the
conditional amnesty should become final only upon the cessation of
hostilities.73  The presently proposed legislation would hopefully
have this effect by postponing the final grant of amnesty until
the completion of the alternate service, but to insure clarity the
final legislation should state that in no case would the amnesty
be effective before Americans stop dying and serving prison terms
in Vietnam.
JAMES ROBERT MLLER
73. The term "cessation of hostilities" may be ambiguous because of the
nature of the war in which a definitive resolution may never be reached.
It has been defined by Congressman Koch as "the date on which the Presi-
dent shall declare by public proclamation, either that armed hostilities in
Southeast Asia have ended, or that the level of United States involvement
therein has been reduced to such a level as to justify the effectuation" of
the amnesty. See note 48 supra.
APPENDIX*
COMPILED BY JOHN C. ETRIDGE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIST OF AMNESTIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1790, TO DATE
Date, Issued By, Persons Affected and Nature of Action:
July 10, 1795, Washington, Whiskey Insurrectionists (several
hundred). General pardon to all who agreed to thereafter obey
the law.
May 21, 1800, Adams, Pennsylvania Insurrectionists. Prosecution
of participants ended. Pardon not extended to those indicted or
convicted.
October 15, 1807, Jefferson, Deserters given full pardon if they
surrendered within 4 months.
February 7, 1812, October 8, 1812, June 14, 1814, Madison, Deserters
-3 proclamations. Given full pardon if they surrendered within
4 months.
February 6, 1815, Madison, Pirates who fought in War of 1812
pardoned of all previous acts of piracy for which any suits, indict-
ments or prosecutions were initiated.
June 1, 1830, Jackson (War Department), Deserters, with pro-
visions; (1) those in confinement returned to duty (2) those at large
under sentence of death discharged, never again to be enlisted.
February 14, 1862, Lincoln (War Department), Political prisoners
paroled.
July 17, 1862 (Confiscation Act), Congress, President authorized
to extend pardon and amnesty to rebels.
March 10, 1863, Lincoln, Deserters restored to regiments without
punishment, except forfeiture of pay during absence.
December 8, 1863, Lincoln, Full pardon to all implicated in or
participating in the "existing rebellion" with exceptions and sub-
ject to oath.
February 26, 1864, Lincoln (War Department), Deserters' Sen-
tences mitigated, some restored to duty.
March 26, 1864, Lincoln, Certain rebels (clarification of December
8, 1863 proclamation).
March 3, 1865, Congress, Desertion punished by forfeiture of
citizenship; President to pardon all who return within 60 days.
March 11, 1865, Lincoln, Deserters who returned to post in sixty
days, as required by Congress.
May 29, 1865, Johnson, Certain rebels of Confederate States
(qualified).
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July 3, 1866, Johnson (War Department), Deserters returned to
duty without punishment except forfeiture of pay.
January 21, 1867, Congress, Section 13 of Confiscation Act (au-
thority of President to grant pardon and amnesty) repealed.
September 7, 1867, Johnson, Rebels-additional amnesty including
all but certain officers of the Confederacy on condition of an oath.
July 4, 1868, Johnson, Full pardon to all participants in "the late
rebellion" except those indicted for treason or felony.
December 25, 1868, Johnson, All rebels of Confederate States
(universal and unconditional).
May 23, 1872, Congress, General Amnesty Law reenfranchised
many thousands of former rebels.
May 24, 1884, Congress, Lifted restrictions on former rebels to
allow jury duty and civil office.
January 4, 1893, Harrison, Mormons-liability for polygamy
amnestied.
September 25, 1894, Cleveland, Mormons- in accord with above.
March 1896, Congress, Lifted restrictions on former rebels to
allow appointment to military commissions.
June 8, 1898, Congress, Universal Amnesty Act removed all
disabilities against all former rebels.
July 4, 1902, T. Roosevelt, Phillipine insurrectionists. Full pardon
and amnesty to all who took an oath recognizing 'the supreme
authority of the United States of America in the Philippine Islands."
June 14, 1917, Wilson, 5,000 persons under suspended sentence
because of change in law (not war-related).
August 21, 1917, Wilson, Clarification of June 14, 1917, proclama-
tion.
March 5, 1924, Coolidge, more than 100 deserters-as to loss of
citizenship for those deserting since W.W. I armistice.
December 23, 1933, F. Roosevelt, 1,500 convicted of having violated
espionage or draft laws (W.W. I) who had completed their sen-
tences.
December 24, 1945, Truman, Several thousand ex-convicts who
had served in W.W. II for at least one year. (Proclamation 2676,
Fed. Register p. 15409.)
December 23, 1947, Truman, 1,523 individual pardons for draft
evasion in W.W. II based on recommendations of President's
Amnesty Board.
December 24, 1952, Truman, Ex-convicts who served in armed
forces not less than I year after June 25, 1950.
December 24, 1952, Truman, All persons convicted for having
deserted between August 15, 1945 and June 25, 1950.
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